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(which comprises branding, employee training and organization improvement). Brazil's share of spending on economic competencies is markedly lower than that observed in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the analysis finds it to be the slowest growing of the major intangible categories. Finally, having extended the intangible investment estimation methodology to produce more disaggregated (industry-level) estimates, the authors show that intangible investment is positively correlated with recent export growth and total factor productivity estimates across manufacturing industries. This suggests that intangible or knowledge-based capital, as measured here, can account for part of the hitherto unexplained component of productivity growth.
INTRODUCTION
Firms invest in a range of knowledge-based or intangible resources such as computerized data and software, patents and trademarks, employee and management skills, or organizational improvements.
Although they do not directly increase the level of physical assets, such knowledge-intensive expenditures resemble investment in traditional fixed capital such as machinery, equipment and buildings in that the benefits from them are not exhausted in a single year. Hence, it has been argued that such expenditures build ‗intangible assets' or ‗knowledge-based capital'. Increases in the stock of such knowledge-based capital are now increasingly recognized as an important driver of innovation and economic growth.
Intangible assets cannot be observed or quantified in the traditional sense. Some recent studies have proposed ways to deduce intangibles from observable tangibles using economic theory.
2 For example, one approach uses the value of securities to infer the quantity of intangible capital held by U.S. corporations (Hall 2000) . 3 But the method which has become the most accepted in recent years estimates intangibles directly from observed expenditures. Building on previous studies that examined the undervaluation of US business investment in the late 1990s, Sichel (2005, 2009; henceforth CHS) proposed a comprehensive categorization of intangible investments, and quantified them by piecing together the corresponding expenditure data for the US. 4 The underlying principle is that any business outlay intended to increase future rather than current consumption should be treated as capital investment.
Spending on most intangibles is treated as intermediate expenditures in conventional national income
accounting, which assumes that all their benefits are captured in the current output of tangible goods. 5 If one accepts the CHS framework, this causes an underestimation of total levels of investment and output.
2 See OECD (2011) for a summary of recent work on measuring intangibles. Fereira and Hamilton (2010) compute ‗intangible capital' as a residual by subtracting the values of physical capital, natural resources and net foreign financial assets from estimated total wealth (the present discounted value of future consumption). This broad definition includes human capital, institutional and social infrastructure, and resources omitted in the natural capital calculations such as subsoil water, diamonds, and fisheries. For Brazil, their average estimated value over 1995, 2000 and 2005 is 70 percent of total wealth, versus 85 percent for the US.
3 Another indirect approach (Nakamura, 2001 ) is based on the insight that the ratio of consumption to GDP should be relatively stable if all investment (tangible and intangible) is properly counted. Hence, any rise in the consumption ratio will indicate the size of the unmeasured investments. 4 The prior studies include OECD (1998), Nakamura (1999 Nakamura ( , 2001 Nakamura ( , 2003 , Brynjolffson and Yang (1999) , McGratten and Prescott (2000) , and Brynjolffson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) . 5 National accounting treatment of intangibles has begun to change. In a number of countries, expenditures on software are now treated as a contribution to investment. And in the US, the Bureau of Economic Analysis will count expenditures on R&D as investment in its headline measure of GDP from 2013 onwards.
For instance, CHS (2009) estimate that US total business investment in intangibles was approximately one trillion dollars in 1999. Including intangible investment thus raises estimated US GDP in 1999 by roughly this amount, or 12 percent. Using the same methodology, Marrano and Haskell (2007) find that as a result of excluding intangibles, market sector gross value added in the UK was understated by 13 percent in 2004. Studies replicating the CHS methodology in other developed OECD countries also report large magnitudes in intangible investment, ranging from 5 to 12 percent of GDP.
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Another common finding is that since intangibles have become increasingly important over time, ignoring them distorts the trends in measured investment and output. For example, the share of intangible investment (or the extent of underestimation of GDP) in the US has risen from about 7 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 2007 (Corrado and Hulten 2010) . Between 1995 and , business investment in intangibles increased faster than investment in tangibles in almost all countries of the EU (Jona-Lasinio et al. 2011 ). In the UK, intangible investment more than doubled as a share of market sector gross value added between 1970 and 2004, overtook fixed capital investment in the mid 1990s and is now roughly 50 percent bigger. In the US, Finland and Sweden, intangible investment is now also greater than tangible investment. And in Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Japan, it comes close (OECD 2010).
Does intangible investment display similar magnitudes or trends in developing countries? This is difficult to answer because apart from a recent study on China (Hulten and Hao, 2011) , there has been no systematic attempt to quantify intangible assets in low and middle income countries. Yet, the question is of interest to policy makers because intangible investment is arguably a key driver of innovation and growth for all countries, and likely is not promoted by the same policy instruments as tangible investment. Our study begins to redress this gap by adapting the CHS methodology to measuring intangible assets in Brazil. While this methodology is not without shortcomings, it has compelling advantages compared to the alternatives. For one, the resulting estimates can be meaningfully compared to existing ones for developed countries and for China. Moreover, the methodology explicitly identifies and measures the components of intangible investment, which is more useful for policy purposes than just backing out economy-wide aggregate intangible investment as a black-box residual from aggregate output and tangible investments.
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We estimate that during 2000-2008, annual private business spending on intangibles in Brazil averaged about 4 percent of GDP. While this is significantly lower than comparable rates for the US, Japan and the UK, which hover around 11 percent, and China at almost 8 percent, it is not too far below estimates for other developed countries such as Italy and Spain at around 5-6 percent. Also, Brazil's business investment in intangibles is only slightly lower than that in fixed assets (which ranged between 4-9 percent of GDP during this period). Thus, our results suggest that intangible investment is an important part of the Brazilian economy. We also find that total intangible investment is increasing, rising from about 3 percent of GDP in 2000 to 5 percent in 2008. However, in recent years, tangible investment appears to be growing even faster. It is too early to say if this signals a divergence between tangible and intangible investment, which would be contrary to the experience of advanced economies.
The CHS classification of intangibles consists of three main categories: computerized information, innovative property, and economic competencies. Of these, Brazil spends the most (2.3 percent of GDP in 2008) on innovative property, which comprises business research and development, copyrights, architectural and engineering designs, new financial products and mineral exploration. Next (at 1.6 percent of GDP) are economic competencies, which include brand equity development through advertizing and market research, employee training and organizational improvement. 7 Lastly, business computer software and database investments total about 1 percent of GDP. However, spending on 7 This is an underestimate because of missing data on labor training expenditures in service sector firms. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the US spends more than Brazil on all types of intangibles. But the gap in their spending is particularly large in the case of economic competencies, especially employee training and organizational improvement. As a share of GDP, US spending on this category is roughly four times that of Brazil. Thus, there is a striking difference in the composition of their intangible expenditures, with economic competencies accounting for as much as 53 percent of all intangible asset expenditures in the US, as opposed to less than 35 percent in Brazil. This finding of relative underinvestment in training and management is consistent with a recent study which finds high and unexploited returns to organizational improvements in a sample of Indian firms (Bloom et al. 2012 ). It may be appropriate for policy makers in developing countries to be concerned about why firms appear to be under-investing in economic competencies.
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CHS and similar studies focused on measuring aggregate investment. Going a step further, we also provide industry-level estimates of intangible investment. 9 As expected, those manufacturing industries which broadly speaking are more technology-sophisticated on average (such as chemical products, machinery and equipment, electronics) invest a larger proportion of their revenue in computerized information and innovative property than relatively less technologically-sophisticated industries on average (such as food products or textiles). Interestingly, firms in less technologically-sophisticated manufacturing industries invest as much in economic competencies as more sophisticated manufacturing industries. But by the standards of advanced economies, both are investing very little in this area, and worryingly, there is sign of a slowdown in this spending. Further, the services sector invests even less than the manufacturing sector in economic competencies.
8 Note that there is no presumption that U.S. levels of investment in intangible assets are optimal, either for the U.S. or for other countries. However, more systematic collection and compilation of these data facilitate more informed discussions on where returns to investment in different types of intangible assets are highest, and why such investments remain lower than desirable. Before jumping to policy implications, it would be important, among others, to identify true shortfalls in investment in particular types of intangible assets from low levels explained by other drivers of investment patterns, such as endowments, industrial structure, technological capabilities, and the broader business environment. See Maloney and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) on the kind of analysis that could be undertaken to determine whether the R&D investment in a particular country is lower than would be expected given its underlying pattern of specialization, and its investment in physical and human capital. 9 Subject to limited availability of data disaggregated by industry for some types of intangible investments.
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A key motivation behind the quantification of intangible capital is that it improves aggregate growth analytics, opening up the black box of traditional residual TFP (total factor productivity) by directly measuring key drivers of innovation. Disaggregated estimates such as those presented in this study can also help explain within-country productivity differences. There is a growing body of work documenting large gaps in TFP across firms within developed and developing countries (Syverson 2011, Banerjee and Duflo 2005) . Recent analyses by Ferraz and Monteiro (2009) for the Brazilian manufacturing sector and by Pages et al. (2010) Closing the gap between leading and lagging firms is therefore critical to raising aggregate productivity. The policy instruments for this purpose can be made more focused if these gaps can be attributed to differences in specific intangible assets along specific dimensions, such as across industries.
10 For example, CHS (2009) suggest that the acceleration in TFP accounted for two-thirds of US growth in the mid1990s when intangibles were excluded, but accounts for less than half when intangibles are included.
11 Brynjolffson and Yang (2001) and Marrano et al. (2007) . 12 See for instance Dutz (2007) for India, and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for China and India, who indicate that within disaggregated industries a plant at the 90 th percentile of the productivity distribution makes on average 5 times as much output with the same measured tangible inputs as the 10 th percentile plant, while this dispersion in the US has been estimated to be closer to 2:1 (Syverson 2004 ).
Using our disaggregated estimates, we make an opening contribution to this agenda by presenting evidence of a strong correlation between intangible investment across Brazilian manufacturing industries during 2000-08 and growth in their conventionally estimated TFP as well as exports, This suggests that the measurement of intangible investment can help quantify sources ofhitherto unexplained productivity growth.
. By showing that intangible investment in Brazil is of significant magnitude and that it is related to productivity changes, we expect that our study will spur efforts to improve data collection for this purpose, in Brazil as well as in other developing countries. Our work also serves to highlight key areas of data shortage, prominently data on firm-specific human capital investment, and on new product development in services (which is not captured in standard R&D measures).
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents our methodology and available data for the Brazil estimation, and compares it to the CHS methodology. Section 3 presents our results, beginning with a comparison of intangible investment in Brazil relative to other available countries, and then examining the evolution of aggregate spending components over time, the composition of spending by industry group, the importance of tangible relative to intangible investment, and estimates of the intangible capital stock. Section 4 presents evidence on the impact of intangible investment (as estimated) on export growth and TFP. Section 5 concludes, and highlights areas for future work. CHS (2005 CHS ( , 2009 new products and production processes, usually leading to a patent or license)  Mineral exploration (spending for the acquisition of new reserves)  Copyright and license costs (spending for the development of entertainment and artistic originals, usually leading to a copyright or license); and development costs in the motion picture, radio and television, sound recording, and book publishing industries  Other product development, design, and research expenses (not necessarily leading to a patent or copyright), such as new product development costs in the financial services industry, new architectural and engineering designs, and R&D in the social sciences and humanities C. Economic competencies  Brand equity (advertising expenditures and market research for the development of brands and trademarks)  Firm-specific human capital (spending on developing workforce skills; for example, on-the-job training and tuition payments for job-related education)  Organizational capital (costs of improvement in organizational structures).
METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The CHS framework for measuring intangible assets
In the US, the Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) already provide data on business expenditures on computer software (own account spending and purchases) and databases (own account spending). For other intangible expenditures, CHS estimations are based on a mixture of public data, private data, and derivative measures.
Official firm surveys are an important source of direct information for CHS. For example, the Census Bureau's Services Annual Survey (SAS) gives firm-level data on purchases of computer databases.
Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collect data on firm expenses on workforce skills development (in-house trainers, outside trainers, tuition reimbursement, and outside training funds).
R&D data are from firm R&D surveys conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF).
But several intangible expenditures are not elicited in any firm survey in the US. In some cases, CHS use data on the revenue of the industry which produces the intangible asset to measure the expenditure on that asset. For example, spending on new architectural and engineering designs is estimated as half of the revenue of the architectural and engineering design industry as reported in SAS. Similarly, outlays on market research are estimated as twice revenues of the market and consumer research industry as reported in SAS, and purchased -organizational‖ capital is estimated using SAS data on the revenues of the management consulting industry.
Finally, due to the absence of direct data, some intangible expenditures are -crudely‖ derived from the closest available proxy. For example, new product development costs in the financial services industry are assumed to be 20 percent of intermediate purchases in that industry. Spending on organizational change is also difficult to measure, because there is no broad consensus on the scope of these assets and little hard data on spending. A substantial portion of these activities are handled in-house and there are no available data on these activities; CHS propose a rudimentary estimate based on the value of executive time, estimated from BLS data on employment and wages in executive occupations.
In general, economic competencies, which is the largest category in the CHS framework, presents the most conceptual and measurement challenges (Aizcorbe et al. 2009 ). For instance, there are questions about whether brand equity should be treated as investment in a national account. Some argue that advertising and marketing expenditures are in some sense unproductive, because they are thought to affect the demand function instead of the production function. In contrast, spending on other intangibles directly affects the production function by either creating a better output or the same output using fewer inputs or better inputs.
Appropriate price deflators and depreciation rates are other outstanding questions in the measurement of intangible capital. CHS and some other recent studies use the goods price deflator associated with the final industry (that is, the industry purchasing the intangible asset) or the economy as a whole (CHS 2009 , Marrano et al. 2007 . The problem here is that this is not the price index for the intangible per se, but rather the price index for the good that used the intangible asset as an input. An alternative solution has been to develop a price index for the costs involved in producing the intangible asset. Since most intangible are produced in the services industry, the major component of these input price indices are wages, such as wages of engineers and scientists (van Rooijen-Horsten and others 2008). However, this ignores any productivity gains in the production of the asset. Unsurprisingly, there is no consensus yet on this issue.
Even for tangible assets, there is controversy and disagreement over the appropriate depreciation rates.
The question becomes much more difficult for intangible assets, since there is no physical ‗wear and tear' to be observed. CHS admit that the rates of depreciation they assume are based on limited information.
For better or worse, these rates have since been used in a number of CHS-type studies. In general, they are significantly higher than commonly-used rates of depreciation of tangible assets, reflecting the view that knowledge-intensive capital becomes obsolete relatively fast.
Methodology and data sources for Brazil estimation
In measuring intangible investment in Brazil, we use the same categorization of intangibles as CHS, and to the extent possible, the closest Brazilian counterpart to the US data source originally used in CHS. Since many of our estimates are based on firm surveys which do not capture the government and household sectors, for the sake of consistency we have excluded government and household investment when calculating aggregates for all investment categories. This is largely consistent with CHS, who focus on business intangible investment.
Reflecting differences in data availability across the US and Brazil, some of our sources differ significantly from the CHS original, though they attempt to measure the same underlying economic phenomenon. The Appendix lists our source for every intangible asset class and compares it to its CHS counterpart.
As explained, CHS estimate purchased intangible investment directly whenever possible: that is, from the expenditure data of the industries purchasing the asset in question. When such direct data are not available, their strategy is to estimate purchased intangible investment using the revenue of the industries that produce the intangible investment in question. The availability of direct expenditure data is poorer in the case of Brazil, and as a result, we have to use the indirect approach -the revenue of the producing industry-more frequently. This is the most common difference between our sources and those in CHS.
For example, we find no surveys in Brazil that estimate the amount spent by industries on computer software and databases, and have to resort to using the Net Operating Income (NOI) of computer software and database services industries from the Annual Survey on Services.
In cases where CHS use crude approximations to estimate something not captured in surveys or national accounts, we replicate their approximation using the closest Brazilian counterpart. Arguably, there are cases in which the CHS approximation could be considered unrealistic for Brazil. To give an example, Finally, while most existing studies of intangibles present only national aggregates, we present intangible investment estimates disaggregated to the industry level. This is a simple corollary of the CHS approach, since they take firm level spending as their starting point. For those intangibles for which we use firm level surveys, this is easily done by aggregating the firm level data to the industry level; the surveys are designed to be representative at the industry level. In cases where we use aggregate national accounts data, we estimate the amounts purchased by different industries by using the national accounts input output tables. 14 Since some industries produce both tangibles and intangibles, the assumption is that inputoutput ratios are similar across both goods.
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In the following paragraphs, we describe our estimation approach in more detail, starting with our estimation of intangible asset categories, followed by our use of price deflators and the assumptions underlying the calculation of investment from expenditures.
(
1) Estimation of intangible asset categories
A. Computerized information. We found no surveys in Brazil that present the amount spent by industries in computer software and databases. Therefore, we used the Net Operating Income of computer software and database services industries from the Annual Survey on Services (PAS), and distributed it over industries using sector coefficients from the input-output matrix. Thus, sector expenditures can be obtained by:
where is the -service purchased‖ (computer software or computer databases) and is the coefficient from the input-output matrix that represents the amount of the service/product used as input by sector .
B. Innovative property. This category can be divided into three components: scientific R&D, copyright and license costs, and other product development, design and research expenses.
The major category here is expenditures in scientific R&D, which includes science and engineering R&D, R&D in petroleum and natural gas exploration, as well as in mining industries. For R&D in mining industries, we use data provided by the National Department of Mineral Production for the period of 2008-2010. We apply the average expenditure observed in this period as a percentage of GDP in order to estimate a time series of expenditures for the previous years (assuming a constant ratio throughout the entire period).
14 We use the same industry classification as that used in the system of national accounts, estimating investment for 55 industry groups. Copyright and license costs mainly include R&D in information-sector industries such as radio, television, sound recording, book publishing and the motion picture industry, usually leading to a copyright or license. Following an admittedly arbitrary choice in CHS, the development costs of new products in the entertainment and artistic industries are estimated as 20% of their employment and operating costs. To this we add estimates of industrial and mining sectors spending on royalties from the Annual Survey of Industry (PIA).
The third item -other product development, design and research expenses -is composed of new product development costs in financial services industries, new architectural and engineering design, and R&D in social sciences and humanities. The first is estimated as 20% of intermediate purchases of financial services, obtained from the Make and Use Tables of the National Accounts System. New financial products development is assumed to be wholly own-account intangible investment in the financial services industry.
The estimates for new architectural and engineering designs are calculated as half of the architectural and engineering services industry Net Operating Revenue; these are then distributed over purchasing industries using sector coefficients from the input-output matrix.
Finally, the expenditure on R&D in social sciences and humanities is estimated by the same method used for science and engineering R&D, except that we replace the number of scientific-technical personnel by the number of social sciences and humanities researchers employed by each industry.
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C. Economic competencies. Three basic asset types are included in economic competencies: ‗brand equity', firm-specific human capital, and organizational structure.
Brand equity expenditures consist of advertising expenditures and market research. For industrial sectors, the information on advertising expenditures is obtained directly from the Annual Survey of Industry; as for other industries such as services, commerce and construction, the values are estimated by distributing the net operating revenue of the advertising industry using sector coefficients from the input-output matrix. Outlays on market research are estimated as twice the industry net operating revenue and also distributed using the input-output matrix.
Measuring firm-specific human capital in Brazil is a major challenge because unlike countries such as the US and UK, there is no regular official survey in Brazil collecting information on worker training expenditures or on the wage and salary costs of employee time in formal and informal training. The last item, organizational structure is composed of a purchased and an own-account portion. The purchased part is estimated as the revenue of the management consulting services industry, multiplied by the sector coefficients from the input-output matrix. The own-account portion is estimated as one-fifth of wages of persons employed in executive occupations.
(2) Price deflators
Unlike CHS, who use industry output deflators, we use the Consumer Price Index (calculated by IBGE) to deflate intangible expenditure. As discussed, the use of final output deflators is controversial because it is not the price index for the intangible, but that for the good that uses the intangible asset as an input.
Since the major input into the production of intangibles is labor, and since the cost of labor (wages) should track the CPI, the CPI could in principle do a better job in capturing the changing price of intangibles. We stress that this issue is far from settled even in developed countries, and that there are ongoing initiatives to design better price deflators for intangibles (Aizcorbe et al. 2009 ).
(3) From expenditure to investment
As discussed in CHS, not all expenditure on intangible items should be classified as investment in longlasting knowledge capital. For some intangibles, economic research suggests that only a portion of the spending on an intangible pays off in a future year (or years). For example, although the marketing literature finds that the effects of advertising are generally short-lived, some advertising has an effect well beyond its first year. In contrast, economic research suggests that all R&D spending has long-term benefits. We follow previous studies in assuming that only certain percentages of the expenditures estimated are to be treated as investment: 60% of expenditures on brand equity, 80% of own-account organizational structure expenditures and 100% of all other assets. These percentages from CHS are largely based on prior economic research. For those intangibles for which there is little indication in the literature of what share of the spending has long-term effects, the choice is admittedly more arbitrary.
RESULTS
This section begins with a comparison of intangible expenditures in Brazil relative to other available countries. Brazil's expenditure pattern in intangibles is then explored in greater detail, by examining the evolution of aggregate spending components over time, the composition of spending by industry group, the importance of tangible relative to intangible investment, and estimates of the intangible capital stock. respectively. Hence, total investment in intangibles is less than total expenditures on them.
A comparison of intangible expenditures across countries
We estimate that in 2006, annual private business expenditures on intangibles in Brazil averaged 4.72 percent of GDP. While this is significantly lower than comparable rates for the US, Japan and the UK, which are in the order of 11 percent, and China at roughly 8 percent, it is not too far below estimates for other developed countries such as Italy and Spain at around 5-6 percent.
Moreover, our estimate for Brazil does not include firm specific human capital (employee training)
expenditures in services firms due to data limitations. We have avoided adjusting for it by extrapolating blindly from manufacturing to services. But for the sake of illustration, suppose we do just that, assuming that as a share of gross value added (GVA), service sector firms spend the same as manufacturing firms on employee training. Since GVA in the services sector is about thrice that in manufacturing, this would quadruple our estimate of firm specific human capital expenditure to about 1.2 percent of GDP, and increase our estimate of total intangible expenditures in Brazil to 5.6 percent of GDP, placing it squarely in the neighborhood of Italy and Spain. Moreover, since the US estimates correspond to an earlier period (1998) (1999) (2000) , the current gap between the US and Brazil is likely to be even larger.
Looking at major categories of intangibles, the US lead over Brazil is largest in two areas: scientific R&D, and economic competencies. The CHS methodology suggests that as a share of GDP, the US spends about 10 times as much as Brazil on organizational capital, three times as much on brand equity, and about 4 times as much on scientific R&D. The cost of employee time spent in training in Brazilian manufacturing is 0.1 percent of GDP; even if one quadruples this to account for missing data for services (in proportion to the ratio of value added in manufacturing and services), it would be less than half that spent in the US (1 percent).
As a result, the composition of intangible expenditures differs markedly across Brazil and more advanced economies like the US and the UK. Brand equity, organizational capital and firm specific human capital comprise more than half of all intangible expenditures in the US and the UK, in contrast to about 35 percent in Brazil. 18 Relative to these economies, Brazilian spending is tilted towards computerized information and product development (other than scientific R&D).
Interestingly, Table 1 
Aggregate expenditures in intangible assets over time
Computer software Computerized databases
Nonetheless, it is striking that even if we assume that Brazil's financial services industries spend only half as much as their US counterpart on product development (that is, only 10 percent of costs), total Brazilian spending on new financial products would still be as high as expenditure on R&D across all industries.
Further, it is unlikely that we are underestimating R&D given that our data source for R&D expenditures, Note that compared to CHS, the labor training estimate we show is an underestimate since it does not include training in services firms. In general, as discussed in Section 2, spending on economic competencies is more difficult to measure than other types of intangible investment, and there is also some controversy about whether advertizing should be included at all. However, with the exception of labor training in services, all our estimates are methodologically comparable to CHS estimates. And unless trends in services differ from those in manufacturing, we are still estimating overall trends without any obvious bias, if not levels. Hence, the key message of Figure 6 is sobering: there is little sign of a positive trend in Brazilian spending on economic competencies. 
The composition of intangible expenditures by industry group
This section discusses our industry-wise estimates of intangible expenditures in Brazil. As explained in Section 2, we obtained these estimates by aggregating firm-level data to the level of industries, or if this was not possible, by using the sector input-output coefficients in the national accounts tables.
Specifically, among major categories, industry-level spending estimates for computerized information, other product development and organizational improvement are based on input-output tables and are therefore less precise than other bottom-up estimates.
We give an overview of our industry level findings again by categories of intangibles, grouping our 55 includes industries like food products, textiles, leather, wood, paper, which are considered technologically less sophisticated on average.
As indicated by the share of computer software and database spending in total industry sales, the extractive industries and (unsurprisingly) ICT are by far the most IT-intensive industries in Brazil ( Figure   7 ). All other sectors spend less than 0.75 percent of sales on computerized information, which is quite low by US standards. As expected, firms in low tech manufacturing spend even less than those in medium/high tech manufacturing. However, manufacturing is also seeing considerable growth in computerized information expenditures, with its share in industry sales doubling in the case of low tech manufacturing.
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In the case of innovative property, services in general spend more than manufacturing (as a share of industry sales). This is driven by product development in the financial industry. Low tech manufacturing spends less than medium/high tech manufacturing and extractive industries. Worryingly, R&D expenditures have not increased much in recent years (except in ICT firms, which have a small share in total R&D spending in the economy). When comparing aggregate spending on economic competencies, we know that the US-Brazil gap is overstated because of the omission of Brazilian expenditures on labor training in the services sector. Figure 9 , in which this spending is disaggregated by industry, suggests that a considerable gap would remain even after adjusting for the omission. Since labor training data are included in the case of manufacturing and extractive industries, estimates for these sectors are comparable to US estimates. In Brazil, manufacturing industries spend about 2 percent of sales on brand equity, firm-specific human capital and organizational improvement. In comparison, the US spends as much as 7 percent of GDP on these intangibles. 20 Another source of concern identified in Figure 9 is the apparent decline in the manufacturing sector's spending on economic competencies.
Figure 9 also suggests that compared to its manufacturing sector, the Brazilian service sector spends very little on economic competencies. To make them more comparable, suppose that we make a crude adjustment for missing labor training expenditures in services by assuming that the ratio of labor training expenditures to those on brand equity and organizational improvement is the same as that in the US (about one-fifth). Then, our estimates suggests that non-ICT service sector spending on economic competencies is about 0.6 percent of sales, in contrast to about 2 percent in manufacturing. Another interesting pattern in Figure 9 is that low tech manufacturing industries spend slightly more on economic competencies than medium/high tech industries.
Note: Service sector estimate excludes labor training expenses.
20 Note that we do not have US estimates disaggregated by manufacturing and services. 
Tangible versus intangible investment in Brazil
Figure 10 compares tangible and intangible investment in Brazil. 21 Compared to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Brazil, which has ranged between 15-18 percent of GDP during 2000-2008, intangible investment is a small share of GDP. However, GFCF includes non-business tangible investment (such as government and household investment, and a part of infrastructural investment), so it is strictly speaking comparable to our estimate of intangible investment. 22 So we have also presented an estimate of business tangible investment, estimated from IBGE's surveys on Industry, Services,
Commerce and Construction Industry using data on acquisitions and improvements to the firms' permanent assets. Our estimates indicate that the ratio of tangible to intangible investment in Brazil's firms is close to 1, which is lower than that reported for for the US and the UK, but comparable to that reported for some other advanced economies like France and Germany (CHS, 2004; Marrano and Haskel, 2006) . It is, however, markedly higher than China's ratio, which is estimated to be 0.2 (Hulten and Hao, 2011) .
There is some hint that in recent years, growth in intangibles has fallen behind that in tangibles. A caveat to this observation is that that the particularly sharp increase in business tangible investment after 2007 appears to be associated with a revision of IBGE's methodology for their surveys on Industry, Services, Commerce and Construction Industry. However, even the GFCF series -which should not have been affected by this methodological revision -shows a markedly higher post-2005 rate of growth than intangible investment. 21 Note that for reasons of comparability with tangible investment, the chart shows estimates of intangible investment, and not expenditure. CHS and similar papers also present the same comparison of business tangible and intangible investment. 22 Source of GFCF Data: National Accounts
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Figure 11 compares tangible and intangible investment by industry. There is a hint here that the ratio of intangible to tangible investment is lower in more ‗low tech' industries, or that in other words, knowledge-related capital matters more in industries which are technologically more sophisticated on average. But in general, Brazilian manufacturing firms still spend more on tangible capital. In contrast, the service sector is already spending more on intangible assets than on tangible assets (and this pattern would be even stronger if we could account for omission of labor training expenditure). Given that services account for a rising share of the economy, this finding may have important implications for policies for encouraging innovation and growth. 
Estimates of the intangible capital stock in Brazil
If expenditures on intangibles truly are an investment, then as with fixed assets, the accumulated ‗stock' of intangible assets is a determinant of Brazil's current GDP levels. Moreover, growth in the stock of intangible assets should help explain GDP growth. Hence, estimating the size of Brazil's intangible capital stock is a key objective of our study.
To obtain intangible capital stocks, we apply the following accumulation identity:
where is our estimates of the real investment series and is the depreciation rate. We use the same depreciation rates as those assumed by CHS and similar studies:
Computerized Information 33
Innovative Property 20
Brand equity 60
Firm-specific resources (human capital and organizational structure) 40
The main challenge is that we do not have data on the starting stock of capital. Fortunately, with the assumed depreciation rates being as high as 20-60 percent per annum, the starting value of the capital stock becomes markedly less significant in determining capital stock estimates with distance from the starting year. In the case of CHS (2005), whose expenditure series starts in the 1980s, estimates of capital stock in the early years vary markedly with the assumed starting value, but converge in later years.
Our estimates of intangible assets start in 2000, which is quite recent compared to previous studies. In (b), we set the capital stock to zero in 1980 and assume the investment in the following years was equal to a percentage of the investment in the first year we had available for each asset (2000 or 2001) . The version is the most optimistic, assuming that Brazil invested as much in intangible assets annually during 1980-1999 as it did in 2000.
As shown in Figure 12, 
THE IMPACT OF INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM EXPORT GROWTH AND TFP PATTERNS
Ultimately, the case for better measurement of intangibles rests on its potential to quantify knowledgebased sources of growth which are largely consigned to the black-box of TFP in current growth analytics.
Although CHS (2009) and similar studies have shown that growth accounting calculations which include the intangible capital stock as an input indicate a sizable role of intangibles as a source of growth, these are still essentially accounting exercises which take the asset nature of intangibles as a given. There is, of course, micro-economic research which supports this assumption for specific types of intangibles, such as the research measuring the impact of R&D expenditures, or the relatively recent work on the impact of management consulting on Indian textile firms (Bloom et al., 2012) . But the impact of aggregate intangible expenditures on future output is yet to be systematically tested, particularly in the context of developing countries. 
Evidence from export growth patterns
Evidence from TFP patterns
We rely on parametric estimates of traditional TFP from residuals of the regression of production values against labor and tangible capital based on a Cobb Douglas production function. The estimates are at a broad industry level, using 2-digit industrial data for 22 manufacturing sectors over the years 2000-08
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.
We present results for two different estimates of TFP, based on two different assumptions for calculating the values of the initial capital stock.
26 Table 2 reports results from regressing our intangible capital measure against both TFP estimates. Results are shown for models with and without industry fixed effects (which allow for unobserved sources of 25 We had to restrict the number of sectors to only 22 manufacturing sectors due to the available data for capital investment. 26 The estimates for initial capital stock are based on the equation,
where g is the average growth of investments in the first 5 years of the series and δ is the depreciation rate for the j th good (De Mello 2003) . For TFP1, we let the sum (gj + δj) vary for each sector, either 10, 15 or 20% depending on which produces a more stable capital/product ratio. For TFP2, we set the sum (gj + δj) to be equal to 10% for all sectors. productivity differences across industries which are fixed over time) and with and without year fixed effects (which allow for unobserved time-varying determinants of TFP which are common across industries). Intangible capital is statistically significantly correlated with both measures of TFP, for all models except for the industry fixed effects model without controls for time (for TFP1).
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; t-statistics are in parentheses.
We stress that these correlations with exports and traditional TFP are only suggestive evidence. Intangible investment could be correlated with other unobserved sources of revenue or productivity growth. Similarly, it is also possible that the correlation observed in Figure 14 is driven by unobserved shocks that affected both export growth and intangible expenditures. Moreover, other determinants of comparative advantage, such as fixed capital accumulation, have not been controlled for in Figure 14 . But at the very least, we hope that this serves to motivate more rigorous future work.
CONCLUSION
The key message of our study is that there is significant intangible investment in the Brazilian business sector, comparable in levels (as a share of GDP) to that estimated for EU countries like Italy and Spain using the same methodology. As a share of GDP, it is about one-third of the investment level in the US, Japan and the UK, the countries which are leading in this area. This finding leads us to two broad conclusions about future work in this area. Same method applied to sci. and eng.
R&D, but using only data of social sciences and humanities researchers. 
